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Some time ago we wrote on the issues surrounding the issues and 
problems that might be encountered in the prospect of undertaking a 
further (“second”) referendum on the decision of the UK to leave the 
EU on March 29th 2019. 
Since the vote of the 23rd June 2016, much has happened in terms of 
political developments within the UK. Notably, the Government lost its 
Parliamentary majority in the election of 2017 and subsequently has 
relied on the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland to 
maintain power. 
However, at the same time, a growing chorus of opinion has been that 
of calls for another referendum, or “People’s Vote” on the decision to 
leave the EU. We have argued elsewhere about the practical 
difficulties of doing so (see here). 
However, the seeming impasse over the Government’s handling of 
negotiations with its EU opposite numbers, so vividly displayed in EU 
leaders’ reaction to the Prime Minister’s “Chequers Proposals” at the 
recent Salzburg summit, have only further pushed the notion of 
another vote as the only way out. 
Whilst holding a second plebiscite has long been the policy of the 
smaller Liberal Democrat party there has been a concerted push by 
members of the Official Opposition Labour Party to try and force the 
party leadership to adopt a similar policy on a second referendum. 
Whilst Jeremy Corbyn has explicitly stated that he is “bound by the 
democracy of our party”[1], it now appears that the party leadership 
have largely managed to steer the terms of the debate, moving away 
from an explicit call for a second vote.  As such, the motion that 
Labour will vote on at their upcoming conference is: 
“If we cannot get a general election, Labour must support all options 
remaining on the table, including campaigning for a public vote.” 
As can be seen, this is relatively non-committal, first in that it explicitly 
prioritises the preferred Labour Party approach (at least as 
encapsulated by Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell) – namely to 
force the Government into an election, and thereby for each party to 
spell out its offerings to the electorate in terms of a Brexit “deal”. Only 
in the event that this cannot be achieved does the second clause 
become operative. Moreover, even in this case the stated policy is 
merely that all options should remain open. It does not commit the 
party to supporting a public vote, merely to not opposing one. 
Finally, even if a new referendum were to be pursued after failing to 
secure a new election, no part of this statement commits Labour to a 
particular set of policy choices to be stipulated on such a 
vote.  Shadow chancellor John McDonnell has stated that he does not 
believe that such a vote should include the option of remaining in the 
EU[2], although other senior figures are less keen on ruling it out 
(notably including Keir Starmer)[1]. 
At this point we thought we would take a look at what Labour’s current 
policy is towards membership of a customs union or staying in the 
Single Market, and hence try to ascertain whether their approach 
would be more likely to deliver a “good deal” for the UK than that of 
Mrs. May. 
Current Labour policy on Brexit, as stated in their 2017 manifesto 
(which still appears valid)[3] is that: “[w]e will scrap the Conservatives’ 
Brexit White Paper and replace it with fresh negotiating priorities that 
have a strong emphasis on retaining the benefits of the Single Market 
and the Customs Union”. 
However, on the details, the Party’s approach seems to differ little 
from the Government, for example, on “securing continued EU market 
access” for UK farmers, or that “[a]s our trading relationship with the 
EU changes it is vital that we retain unrestricted access for our goods 
and services”. 
These all sound commensurate with continued EEA membership, 
although the Party’s manifesto also appears to commit it to remaining 
outside key elements of this, stating that “will ensure all future trade 
deals safeguard the right to regulate in the public interest and to 
protect public services”. 
The most notable policy divergence from the governing Conservative 
Party regarding Brexit is regarding entering a customs union with the 
EU, which is now official Labour Party policy.  However, 
pronouncements from senior Labour figures have implied that Labour 
would only agree to a customs union with the EU if it could ensure 
that the UK “has a say” in the creation of future trade deals. Indeed, 
Corbyn has stated that: 
“A new customs arrangement would depend on Britain being able to 
negotiate agreement of new trade deals in our national interest. 
Labour would not countenance a deal that left Britain as a passive 
recipient of rules decided elsewhere by others. That would mean 
ending up as mere rule takers.”[4] 
In key respects then, Labour’s overall approach to Brexit shares many 
similarities with the Chequers Proposals slated by EU leaders, and 
would run into the same difficulties in trying to secure a successful 
withdrawal agreement from the EU. 
The only difference seems to be in that having been in Opposition, 
should they find themselves in Government on the back of a 
successful election campaign, they would have strong grounds to 
“restart” the Article 50 negotiations clock, as Keir Starmer put it. In 
this, they would be likely to be granted an extension by the EU. 
Labour’s stance on regulatory divergence between Northern Ireland 
and the rest of the UK, thereby preserving the GFA and the “all-
Ireland” economy, would also be far less likely to be influenced by the 
DUP. it would also increase the likelihood of a referendum on North-
South reunification in Ireland. 
In this regard, Labour’s approach to Northern Ireland would in all 
likelihood guarantee a status quo ante period of continued customs 
union and EEA membership during a Transition period after the formal 
withdrawal date. 
However, in terms of their overall approach to negotiating a new 
economic relationship with the EU, it is hard to see them securing any 
bespoke arrangement – and that the current “deal” scenarios of EEA 
membership, or a Canada-type free trade agreement – would 
continue to be the only ones on offer. 
Unless of course, the Labour party position evolves further to not in 
effect leaving the EU at all – something a clear majority of its 
members desire. 
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